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As machine learning becomes more widely used, the need to study its implications in security and privacy
becomes more urgent. Research on the security aspects of machine learning, such as adversarial attacks, has
received a lot of focus and publicity, but privacy related attacks have received less attention from the research
community. Although there is a growing body of work in the area, there is yet no extensive analysis of privacy
related attacks. To contribute into this research line we analyzed more than 40 papers related to privacy
attacks against machine learning that have been published during the past seven years. Based on this analysis,
an attack taxonomy is proposed together with a threat model that allows the categorization of the different
attacks based on the adversarial knowledge and the assets under attack. In addition, a detailed analysis of the
different attacks is presented, including the models under attack and the datasets used, as well as the common
elements and main differences between the approaches under the defined threat model. Finally, we explore
the potential reasons for privacy leaks and present an overview of the most common proposed defenses.
CCS Concepts: • Computing methodologies→Machine learning; • Security and privacy;
Additional Key Words and Phrases: privacy, machine learning, membership inference, property inference,
model extraction, reconstruction
1 INTRODUCTION
Fueled by large amounts of available data and hardware advances, machine learning has experienced
tremendous growth, both in terms of academic research and of real world applications. At the
same time, the impact of machine learning in security, privacy, and fairness is receiving increasing
attention. In terms of privacy, our personal data are being harvested by almost every online
service and are used to train models that power machine learning based applications. When these
applications are presented as black-boxmodels, it is expected that they should not reveal information
about the data used for their training. If a model was trained using sensitive data such as location,
health records, or identity information, then an attack that allows an adversary to extract this
information is highly undesirable. At the same time, if private data have been used without their
owners’ consent, the same type of attack could be used as a way to determine unauthorized use
and thus work in favor of the user’s privacy.
The security of machine learning and the impacts of adversarial attacks in the performance of the
models have been widely studied in the community, with several surveys highlighting the major
advances in the area [6, 57, 75, 98]. Some of these surveys also provide a partial coverage on the topic
of privacy attacks, but there is no overall survey that considers privacy attacks against machine
learning models as its main focus. This paper is, as far as we know, the first comprehensive survey
of privacy-related attacks against machine learning. This survey focuses on leaks of information
from the training data and also leaks of information about the models themselves. In this sense, an
attack that extracts information about the model structure is, strictly speaking, an attack against
model confidentiality. The decision to include model extraction attacks was made because (i)
these attacks are an important part of the threat model presented in Section 3 and (ii) because in
the existing literature, attacks against model confidentiality are usually grouped together with
privacy attacks [6, 75]. In addition, Veale et al. [93] made the argument that privacy attacks such as
membership inference (Section 4.1) increase the risk of machine learning models being classified as
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personal data under the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) because they can render a
person identifiable. Although models are currently not covered by the GDPR, if they are potentially
considered as personal data, then attacks against them may fall on the same scope as attacks against
personal data. This may be further complicated by the fact that model extraction attacks can be
used as a stepping stone for other privacy based attacks.
This survey present and summarize research about privacy-based attacks on machine learning
that has been published in top tier conferences and journals during 2014-2020 in the areas of security,
privacy, andmachine learning. An initial set of papers was selected in Google Scholar using keyword
searches related to "privacy", "machine learning" and the names of attacks themselves. After the
initial set of papers was selected, backward searches based on their references as well as forward
searches based on papers that cited them, were used to generated the final list.
The main contributions of this paper are:
• The first comprehensive study of attacks against privacy and confidentiality of machine
learning systems.
• A threat model and a taxonomy of attacks against machine learning privacy (Sections 3
and 4).
• An in-depth comparison of similarities and differences of the design of the attacks (Section 5).
• A discussion on the probable causes of the privacy leaks in machine learning systems (Sec-
tion 6).
• An overview of the different defensive measures tested to protect against the attacks (Sec-
tion 7).
2 MACHINE LEARNING
Machine learning (ML) is a field that studies the problem of learning from data without being
explicitly programmed. This section provides a very high level overview of machine learning in
order to facilitate the discussion in the subsequent chapters and to introduce the relevant notation.
Several textbooks such as [7, 24, 64, 81] provide a more thorough coverage of the topic.
2.1 Types of Machine Learning
At a very high level ML is usually split into three major areas: supervised, unsupervised and
reinforcement learning. Deep Learning is a subset of ML that focuses on deep neural network (DNN)
models. It has grown in popularity during the past decade and has applications in all ML areas.
2.1.1 Supervised Learning. In a supervised learning setting, a model f with parameters θ is a
mapping function between inputs x and outputs y = f (x;θ ), where x is a vector of attributes
or features with dimensionality n and the output or response can assume different dimensions
depending on the learning task. A training set D used for training the model is a set of data points
D = {(xi , yi )}mi=1, wherem is the number of the input-output pairs. The most common supervised
learning tasks are classification and regression. The vast majority of the attack papers presented in
this work are focused in supervised learning.
2.1.2 Unsupervised Learning. In unsupervised learning there are no labels y. The training set D
consists only of the inputs xi . Unsupervised algorithms aim to find structure or patterns in the
data without having access to labels. Usual tasks in unsupervised learning are clustering, feature
learning and dimensionality reduction. Generative tasks that aim to learn how to generate samples
from the underlying data distribution, such as Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) [25] and
Variational Autoencoders (VAEs) [48] are also considered a part of unsupervised learning.
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(a) GAN architecture (b) VAE architecture
Fig. 1. GAN and VAE architectures. The GAN consists of a Generator (G) and a Discriminator (D). Similarly,
the VAE consists of a Encoder (Enc) and an Decoder (Dec). Attacks against GANs and VAEs take into account
varying levels of knowledge about G and Dec as well as possible although unlikely access to D and Enc.
Generative Adversarial Networks consist of two neural networks, a generator and a discrim-
inator. The generator G maps a latent variable z typically sampled from a Gaussian or Uniform
distribution, to the output x . The discriminator D is trying to learn the difference between the
generated output and the real data. The generic architecture of GANs is depicted in Figure 1(a).
The training between the two components is adversarial in nature and in its initial formulation it
was expressed as a zero-sum game [25]. Since its inception, several hundreds of papers have been
published proposing formulations that improve not only the quality of generated data, but also
address problems in GAN training such as mode collapse.
Variational Autoencoders consist also of two components, an encoder Enc and a decoderDec .
The encoder maps the input x to a latent variable zs while the decoder takes z as input and tries
to reconstruct x. VAEs are constructed and trained in such a way so that the latent variable z is
sampled from a known distribution, typically a Gaussian [48]. The VAE architecture is depicted in
Figure 1(b).
Attacks against unsupervised learning are until now focused mostly on GANs and VAEs.
2.1.3 Reinforcement Learning. Reinforcement learning concerns itself with agents that make
observations of the environment and use these to take actions with the goal of maximizing a reward
signal. In the most general formulation the set of actions is not predefined and the rewards are not
necessarily immediate but can occur after a sequence of actions [90]. At the moment, no privacy
related attacks against reinforcement learning have been reported but it has been used to mount
model extraction attacks [72].
2.2 Training and Inference
Training of supervised ML models usually follows the Empirical Risk Minimization (ERM) approach,
where the objective is to find the parameters θ ∗ that minimize the risk or objective function, which
is calculated as an average over the training dataset:
J(D;θ ) = 1
m
m∑
i=1
l(f (xi ;θ ),yi ) (1)
where l(·) is a loss function such as cross entropy loss andm is the number of data points in the
dataset D.
The idea behind ERM is that the training dataset is a subset drawn from the unknown true
data distribution for the learning task. Since we have no knowledge of the true data distribution
we cannot minimize the true objective function but instead we minimize the estimated objective
over the data samples that we have. In some cases a regularization term is added to the objective
function in order to reduce overfitting and stabilize the training process.
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The training process usually involves an iterative optimization algorithm such as gradient descent
which aims to minimize the objective function by following the path induced by its gradients.
When the dataset is large, as is often the case with deep neural networks, taking one gradient step
becomes too costly. In that case, a variant of gradient descent which involves steps taken over
smaller batches of data is preferred. This optimization method is called Stochastic Gradient Descent
(SGD):
θt+1 = θt − ηg (2)
g =
1
m′
∇θ
m′∑
i=1
l(f (xi ;θ ), yi ) (3)
where η is the learning rate and the gradient g of the loss function with respect to parameters θ
is calculated over the batch of data that has sizem′.
Once models are trained, they can be used to make inferences or predictions over previously
unseen data. At this stage, the assumption is that the model parameters are fixed.
3 THREAT MODEL
In order to understand and defend against attacks to machine learning from a privacy perspective, it
is useful to have a general model of the environment, the different actors, and the assets to protect.
From a threat model perspective, the assets that are sensitive and are potentially under attack, are
the training datasetD and the model itself; its parameters θ , its hyper-parameters, and architecture.
The actors identified in this threat model are
(1) The data owners whose data may be sensitive.
(2) Themodel owners which may or may not own the data and may or may not want to share
information about their models.
(3) Themodel consumers that use the services that the model owner exposes, usually via some
sort of programming or user interface.
(4) The adversary may also have access to these interfaces as a normal consumer does. If the
model owner allows, they may have access to the model itself.
Figure 2 depicts the assets and the identified actors under the threat model, as well as the
information flow and possible actions. This threat model is a logical model and it does not preclude
the possibility that some of these assets may be collocated or spread in multiple locations.
Since the interest of this survey is in the privacy attacks based on unintentional information
leakage with regards to the data or the machine learning model, there is no coverage of security-
based attacks, such as model poisoning or evasion attacks, or attacks against the infrastructure that
hosts the data, the models or the provided services.
The different attack surfaces against machine learning models can be modelled in terms of
adversarial knowledge. The range of knowledge varies from limited e.g., having access to a
machine learning API, to having knowledge of the full model parameters and training settings.
In between these two extremes there is a range of possibilities such as partial knowledge of the
model architecture, its hyper-parameters or training setup. The knowledge of the adversary can
also be considered from a dataset point of view. In the majority of the works reviewed, the authors
assume the adversary has no knowledge of the training data samples, but some knowledge of the
underlying data distribution.
From a taxonomy point of view, the attacks where the adversary has no knowledge of the model
parameters, architecture or training data are called black-box attacks. An example of a black-box
system is Machine Learning as a Service (MLaaS) where the users usually provide some input and
receive either a prediction vector or a class label from a pre-trained model hosted in the cloud. Most
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Fig. 2. Threat Model of privacy and confidentiality attacks against machine learning systems. The human
figure represents actors and the symbols represent the assets. Dashed lines represent data and information
flow, while full lines represent possible actions. In red are the adversarial actions available under the threat
model.
black-box papers assume the existence of a prediction vector. In a similar fashion, white-box are
the types of attacks where the adversary has either complete access to the target model parameters
or their loss gradients during training. This is the case for example, in most distributed modes of
training. In between the two extremes, there are also attacks that make stronger assumptions than
the black-box ones, but do not assume full access to the model parameters. We refer to these attacks
as partial white-box attacks. It is important to add here, that the majority of works assumes full
knowledge of the expected input, although some form of preprocessing might be required.
The time of the attack is another parameter to consider from a taxonomy point of view. The
majority of the works in the area are dealing with attacks during inference, however most white-
box attacks assume access to the model parameters and gradients during training. Attacks during
the training phase of the model open up the possibilities for different types of adversarial behavior.
A passive or honest-but-curious attacker does not interfere with the training process and they are
only trying to infer knowledge during or after the training. If the adversary interferes with the
training in any way, they are considered an active attacker.
4 TAXONOMY OF THREATS
In privacy related attacks an adversary’s goal is related to gaining knowledge that was not intended
to be shared, such as knowledge about the training data D or information about the model, or
even extracting information about properties of the data such as unintentionally encoded biases.
In our taxonomy, the attacks studied are categorized into four types: membership inference,
reconstruction, property inference, andmodel extraction.
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4.1 Membership Inference Attacks
Membership inference tries to determine whether an input sample xwas used as part of the training
set D. This is the most popular category of attacks and was first introduced by Shokri et al. [85].
The attack assumes only knowledge of the model’s prediction vector (black-box) and was carried
against supervised machine learning models. White-box attacks are also a threat especially in a
collaborative setting, where an adversary can mount both passive and active attacks. Access to
model parameters and gradients allows for more effective white-box membership inference attacks
in terms of attack accuracy [66].
Apart from supervised models, generative models such as GANs and VAEs are also susceptible
to membership inference attacks [11, 30, 34]. The goal of the attack in this case is to retrieve
information about the training data using varying degrees of knowledge of the data generating
elements.
Finally, while we are mostly focused on these attacks from a negative perspective, they can also
be used from a positive viewpoint. One such example is the ability to audit black-box models in
order to see if data have been used without the data owner’s authorization [35, 86].
4.2 Reconstruction Attacks
Reconstruction attacks try to recreate one or more training samples and / or their respective
training labels. The reconstruction can be partial or full. Previous work have also used the terms
attribute inference ormodel inversion to describe attacks that, given output labels and partial
knowledge of some features, try to recover sensitive features or the full data sample. For the purpose
of this survey, all these attacks are considered as part of the larger set of reconstruction attacks.
The term attribute inference has been used in other parts of the privacy related literature to
describe attacks that infer sensitive "attributes" of a targeted user by leveraging publicly accessible
data [23, 41]. These attacks are not part of this review as they are mounted against the individual’s
data directly and not against ML models.
A major distinction between the works of this category is between those that create an actual
reconstruction of the data [31, 100, 104, 109, 110] and the ones that create class representatives or
probable values of sensitive features that do not necessarily belong to the training dataset [20, 33,
36, 104]. In classification models, the latter case is limited to scenarios were classes are made up of
one type of object, e.g., faces of the same person. While this limits the applicability of the attack, it
can still be an interesting scenario in some cases.
4.3 Property Inference Attacks
The ability to extract dataset properties which were not explicitly encoded as features or were not
correlated to the learning task, is called property inference. An example of property inference is
the extraction of information about the ratio of women and men in a patient dataset when this
information was not an encoded attribute or a label of the dataset. Or having a neural network
that performs gender classification and can be used to infer if people wear glasses or not. In some
settings this type of leak can have privacy implications. These types of properties can also be used
to get more insight about the training data, which can lead to adversaries using this information
to create similar models [2] or even have security implications when the learned property can be
used to detect vulnerabilities of a system [21].
Property inference aims to extract information that was learned from the model unintentionally
and that is not related to the training task. Even well generalized models may learn properties
that are relevant to the whole input data distribution and sometimes this is unavoidable or even
necessary for the learning process. What is more interesting from an adversarial perspective are
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properties that may be inferred from the specific subset of data that was used for training, or
eventually about a specific individual.
Property inference attacks so far target either class wide properties [2, 21] or the emergence
of properties within a batch of data [61]. The latter attack was performed against collaborative
training of a model.
4.4 Model Extraction Attacks
Model extraction is a class of black-box attacks where the adversary tries to extract information
and potentially fully reconstruct a model or create a substitute model fˆ that behaves very similarly
to the model under attack f . When it comes to substitute models the focus is on creating models
that either match the accuracy of f in some test set that is drawn from the input data distribution
related to the learning task [49, 63, 72, 91] or to create a model fˆ that matches f at a set of input
points that are not necessarily related to the learning task [13, 39, 44, 91]. Jagielski et al. [39]
referred to the former attack as task accuracy extraction and the latter as fidelity extraction. In
task accuracy extraction the adversary is interested in creating a substitute that learns the same
task as the target model equally well or better. In the latter case the adversary aims to create a
substitute that replicates the decision boundary of f as faithfully as possible. This type of attack
can be later used as a stepping stone before mounting other types of attacks such as adversarial
attacks [44, 74] or membership inference attacks [66]. In both cases, it is assumed that the adversary
wants to be as efficient as possible, i.e., to use as few queries as possible. Knowledge of the target
model architecture is assumed in some works but it is not strictly necessary if the adversary selects
a substitute model that has the same or higher complexity than the model under attack [44, 49, 72].
Apart from creating substitute models there are also approaches that focus on recovering informa-
tion from the target model such as hyper-parameters in the objective function [97] or information
about various neural network architectural properties such as activation types, optimisation algo-
rithm, number of layers, etc [71].
5 DESIGN OF THE ATTACKS
To study the design of these attacks, more than 40 papers were analyzed in relation to privacy
attacks against machine learning. This section describes in some detail the techniques used in
most of these attacks by tracing the most common design elements as well as essential differences
between the various techniques. The papers are discussed in three sections: attacks on centralized
supervised learning, attacks on distributed modes of learning, and attacks on generative models.
5.1 Attacks Against Centralized Supervised Learning
5.1.1 Shadow training. A common design pattern for a lot of supervised learning attacks is the
use of shadowmodels andmeta-models or attack-models [2, 21, 35, 40, 71, 77–79, 85, 92]. The
general shadow training architecture is depicted in Figure 3. The main intuition behind this design
is that models behave differently when they see data that do not belong to the training dataset.
This difference is captured in the model outputs as well as in their internal representations. In
most designs there is a target model and a target dataset. The adversary is trying to infer either
membership or properties of the training data. They train a number of shadowmodels using shadow
datasets Dshadow = {xshadow,i ,yshadow,i }ni=1 that usually are assumed to come from the same
distribution as the target dataset. After the shadow models’ training, the adversary constructs an
attack dataset Dattack = { fi (xshadow,i ),yshadow,i }ni=1, where fi is the respective shadow model.
The attack dataset is used to train the meta-model which essentially performs inference based on
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Fig. 3. Shadow training architecture. At first, a number of shadow models are trained with their respective
shadow datasets in order to emulate the behavior of the target model. At the second stage, a meta-model
is being trained from the outputs of the shadow models and the known labels of the shadow datasets. The
meta-model is used to infer membership or properties of data or the model given the output of the target
model.
the outputs of the shadow models. Once the meta-model is trained it is used for testing using the
outputs of the target model.
5.1.2 Membership inference attacks. In membership inference black-box attacks the output of the
shadow models is usually a prediction vector [40, 77, 79, 85, 92]. The labels used for the attack
dataset come from the test and training splits of the shadow data, where data points that belong to
the test set are labelled as non-members of the training set. The meta-model is trained to recognize
patterns in the prediction vector output of the target model. These patterns allow the meta-model
to infer whether a data point belongs to the training dataset or not. The number of shadow models
affects the attack accuracy but it also incurs cost to the attackers. Salem et al. [79] showed that
membership inference attacks are possible with as little as one shadow model.
Shadow training can be further reduced to a threshold-based attack, where instead of training a
meta-model, one can calculate a suitable threshold function that indicates whether a sample is a
member of the training set. The threshold can be learned from multiple shadow models [78] or
even without using any shadow models [106]. Sablayrolles et al. [78] showed that a Bayes optimal
membership inference attack depends only on the loss and their attack outperformed previous
attacks such as [85, 106]. In terms of attack accuracy, they reported up to 90.8% attack accuracy
against large neural network models such as VGG16 which were performing classification on the
Imagenet dataset.
In addition to relaxations on the number of shadow models, attacks have been shown to be
transferable i.e., an attack to one target model transfers to another target if the training dataset
was the same [92].
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Shadow model training requires a shadow dataset. One of the main assumptions of membership
inference attacks against supervised learning models is that the adversary has no or limited
knowledge of the training samples used. However the adversary knows something about the
underlying data distribution of the training data. If the adversary does not have access to a suitable
dataset, they can try to generate one [85, 92]. Access to statistics about the probability distribution
of several features allows an attacker to create the shadow dataset using sampling techniques.
If a statistics based generation is not possible, a query based approach using the target models’
prediction vectors is possible. If the adversary manages to find input data that generate predictions
with a high confidence, then no prior knowledge of the data distribution is required for a successful
attack [85]. Salem et al. [79] went so far as to show that it is not even necessary to train the shadow
models using data from the same distribution as the target, making the attack more realistic since
it does not assume any knowledge of the training data.
The previous discussion is mostly relevant to supervised classification or regression tasks. The
efficacy of membership inference attacks against sequence-to-sequence models training for machine
translation was studied by [35]. The authors used shadow models that try to mimic the target
model’s behavior and then used a meta-model to infer membership. They found that sequence
generation models are much harder to attack compared to other types of models such as image
classification. However, membership of out-of-domain and out-of-vocabulary data was easier to
infer.
5.1.3 Reconstruction attacks. The initial reconstruction attacks were based on the assumption that
the adversary has access to the model f , the priors of the sensitive and non-sensitive features
and the output of the model for a specific input x . The attack was based on estimating values of
sensitive features given values of non-sensitive features and the output label [20]. This method used
a maximum a posteriori (MAP) estimate of the attribute that maximizes the probability of observing
the known parameters. Hidano et al. [33] used a similar attack but they made no assumption about
knowledge of the non-sensitive attributes. In order for their attack to work, they assumed that the
adversary can perform a model poisoning attack during training.
Both of the previous attacks worked against linear regression models, but as the number of
features and their range increases, attack feasibility decreases. In order to overcome the limitations
of the MAP attack, Fredrikson et al. [19] proposed another inversion attack which recovers features
using target labels and optional auxiliary information. The attack was formulated as an optimization
problem where the objective function is based on the observed model output and uses gradient
descent in the input space in order to recover the input data point. The method was tested on image
reconstruction. The result was a class representative image which in some cases was quite blurry
even after denoising. A formalization of the model inversion attacks in [19, 20] was later proposed
by Wu et al. [101].
Since the optimization problem in [19] is quite hard to solve, Zhang et al. [109] proposed to use
a GAN in order to learn some auxiliary information of the training data and produce better results.
The auxiliary information in this case is the presence of blurring or masks in the input images.
The attack first uses the GAN in order to learn to generate realistic looking images from masked
or blurry images using public data. The second step is a GAN inversion that calculates the latent
vector zˆ which generates the most likely image:
zˆ = argmin
z
Lpr ior (z) + λLid (z) (4)
where the prior loss Lpr ior is ensuring the generation of realistic images and Lid ensures that
the images have a high likelihood in the target network. The attack is quite successful, especially
against masked images.
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The only black-box reconstruction attack until now was proposed by Yang et al. [104]. This
attack employs an additional classifier that performs an inversion from the output of the target
model f (x) to a candidate output xˆ . The setup is similar to that of an autoencoder, only in this
case the target network that plays the role of the encoder is a black-box and it is not trainable. The
attack was tested in different types of target model outputs: the full prediction vector, a truncated
vector and the target label only. When the full prediction vector is available the attack performs a
good reconstruction, but with less available information, the produced data point looks more like a
class representative.
5.1.4 Property inference attacks. In property inference the shadow datasets are labelled based on
the properties that the adversary wants to infer, so the adversary needs access to data that have
the property and data that do not have it. The meta-model is then trained to infer differences in
the output vectors of the data that have the property versus the ones that they don’t have it. In
white-box attacks, the meta-model input can be other feature representations such as support
vectors [2] or transformations of neural network layer outputs [21].
5.1.5 Model extraction attacks. When the adversary has access to the inputs and prediction outputs
of a model, it is possible to view these pairs of inputs and outputs as a system of equations where
the unknowns are the model parameters [91] or hyper-parameters of the objective function [97].
In the case of a linear binary classifier, the system of equations is linear and only d + 1 queries are
necessary to retrieve the model parameters, where d is the dimension of the parameter vector θ . In
more complex cases, such as multi-class linear regression or multi-layer perceptrons the systems of
equations are no longer linear. Optimization techniques such as BroydenâĂŞFletcherâĂŞGoldfar-
bâĂŞShanno (BFGS) [70] or stochastic gradient descent are then used in order to approximate the
model parameters [91].
Lack of prediction vectors or a high number of model parameters renders equation solving
attacks inefficient. A strategy is required in order to select the inputs that will provide the most
useful information for model extraction. From this perspective, model extraction is quite similar to
active learning (AL) [10]. Active learning makes use of an external oracle that provides labels to
input queries. The oracle can be a human expert or a system. The labels are then used to train or
update the model. In the case of model extraction, the target model plays the role of the oracle.
Following the AL approach, several papers propose an adaptive training strategy. They start
with some initial data points or seeds which they use to query the target model and retrieve labels
or prediction vectors which they use to train the substitute model fˆ . For a number of subsequent
rounds they extend their dataset with new synthetic data points based on some adaptive strategy
that allows them to find points close to the decision boundary of the target model [10, 44, 74, 91].
Chandrasekaran et al. [10] provided a more query efficient method of extracting non-linear models
such as kernel SVMs, with slightly lower accuracy than the method proposed by Tramer et al. [91],
while the opposite was true for Decision Tree models.
Several other strategies for selecting the most suitable data for querying the target model use:
(i) data that are not synthetic but belong to different domains such as images from different
datasets [13, 72], (ii) semi-supervised learning techniques such as rotation loss [107] or Mix-
Match [5] to augment the dataset [39] or (iii) randomly generated input data [44, 49, 91]. In terms
of efficiency, unsupervised methods such as MixMatch require much fewer queries than fully
supervised extraction methods in order to perform similarly or better in terms of task accuracy
and fidelity, against models trained for classification using CIFAR-10 and SVHN datasets [39]. For
larger models, trained for Imagenet classification, even querying a 10% of the Imagenet data, gives a
comparable performance to the target model [39]. Against a deployed MLaaS service that provides
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facial characteristics, Orekondy et al. [72] managed to create a substitute model that performs at
80% of the target in task accuracy, spending as little as $30.
Some, mostly theoretical, work has demonstrated the ability to perform direct model extraction
beyond linear models [39, 63]. Full model extraction was shown to be theoretically possible against
two-layer fully connected neural networks with rectified linear unit (ReLU) activations by Milli
et al. [63]. However, their assumption was that the attacker has access to the loss gradients with
respect to the inputs. Jagielski et al. [39] managed to do a full extraction of a similar network
without the need of gradients. Both approaches take into account that ReLUs transfomrs the neural
network into a piece-wise linear function of the inputs. By probing the model with different inputs
it is possible to identify where the linearity breaks and use this knowledge to calculate the network
parameters. In a hybrid approach that uses both a learning strategy and direct extraction, Jagielski
et al. [39], showed that they can extract a model trained on MNIST with almost 100% fidelity by
using 219.2 to 222.2 queries against models that contain up to 400,000 parameters. However, this
attack assumed access to the loss gradients similarly to [63].
Finally, apart from learning substitute models directly, there is also the possibility of extracting
model information such as architecture, optimization methods and hyper-parameters using shadow
models [71]. The majority of attacks were performed against neural networks trained on MNIST.
Using the shadow models’ prediction vectors as input, the meta-models managed to learn to
distinguish whether a model has certain architectural properties. An additional attack by the
same authors, proposed to generate adversarial samples which were created by models that have
the property in question. The generated samples were created in a way that makes a classifier
output a certain prediction if they have the attribute in question. The target model’s prediction on
this adversarial sample is then used to establish if the target model has a specific property. The
combination of the two attacks, proved to be the most effective approach. Some properties such as
activation functions, presence of dropout and max-pooling where the most successfully predicted.
5.2 Attacks Against Distributed Learning
In centralized modes of learning, attacks are focused on one machine learning model and its proper-
ties. The adversaries are assumed to be able to query the model or to have access to its parameters.
Distributed modes of learning such as federated or collaborative learning, introduce different spatial
models of adversaries. In a federated learning setting, the adversary can be collocated with the
global model but it can also be a local attacker that actively or passively tries to attack (Figure 4).
The presence of multiple actors allows also the possibility of colluding adversaries that join forces.
Federated learning (FL) is a form of decentralized training where the goal is to learn one global
model from data stored in multiple remote devices / locations [52]. The main idea is that the data
do not leave the remote devices. They are processed locally and only the intermediate updates are
sent to the central server that hosts the global model. The most popular learning algorithm for FL
is Federated Averaging [59], where each remote device, calculates one step of the gradient descent
locally and then shares the updated model weights with the parameter server. The parameter
server averages the weights of all the remote participants and updates the global model which is
subsequently shared again with the remote devices:
θt+1 =
1
K
K∑
k=1
θ (k )t (5)
where K is the number of remote participants and the parameters θkt of participant k have been
calculated locally based on Equations 2 and 3.
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Fig. 4. Threat model in a distributed learning setting. Dashed lines represent data and information flows,
while full lines represent possible actions. In red are the adversarial actions available under the threat model.
In this setting the adversary can be placed either at the parameter server or locally. Model consumers are
not depicted for reasons of simplicity. In a federated learning setting, local model owners are also model
consumers.
Another approach that comes from the area of distributed computing is Downpour (or synchro-
nized) SGD [14], which proposes to share the loss gradients of the distributed devices with the
parameter server that aggregates them and then performs one step of gradient descent:
θt+1 = θt − η
K∑
k=1
m(k )
M
g(k )t (6)
where g(k )t is the gradient computed by participant k based on Equation 3 using their local data,
m(k ) is the number of data points in the remote participant andM is the total number of data points
in the training data. After the calculation of Equation 6, the parameter server shares the updated
model parameters θt+1 with the remote participants.
Both Federated Averaging and Synchronous SGD can be problematic from a privacy perspective
because, in essence, each remote device has access to the model parameters. The same applies to the
parameter server that obtains the model parameters or their loss gradients from multiple devices.
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5.2.1 Membership inference attacks. Nasr et al. [65] showed that a membership inference attack is
more effective than the black-box one, under the assumption that the adversary has some auxiliary
knowledge about the training data, i.e., has access to some data from the training dataset, either
explicitly or because they are part of a larger set of data the adversary possesses. The adversary
can use the model parameters and the loss gradients as inputs to another model which is trained to
distinguish between members and non-members. The white-box attack accuracy against various
neural network architectures was up to 75.1%, however, all models had a high generalization error.
In the active attack scenario, the attacker which is also a local participant, alters the gradient
updates to perform a gradient ascent instead of descent for the data whose membership is under
question. If some other participant uses the data for training, then their local SGD will significantly
reduce the gradient of the loss and the change will be reflected in the updated model, allowing
the adversary to extract membership information. Attacks from a local active participant reached
attack accuracy of 76.3% and in general attack active attack accuracy was higher than the passive
accuracy in all tested scenarios. However, as the number of participants increases, it has adverse
effects in the attack accuracy which drops significantly after five or more participants. A global
active attacker which is in a more favourable position, can isolate the model parameter updates
they receive from each participant. Such an active attacker reached attack accuracy of 92.1%.
5.2.2 Property inference attacks. Passive property inference requires access to some data that
possess the property and some that do not. The attack applies to both federated average and
synchronized SGD settings, where each remote participant receives the parameter updates from the
parameter server after each training round [61]. The initial dataset is of the form D ′ = {(x, y, y′)},
where x and y are the data used for training the distributed model and y′ are the property labels.
Every time the local model is updated, the adversary calculates the loss gradients for two batches of
data. One batch that has the property in question and one that does not. This allows the construction
of a new dataset that consists of gradients and property labels (∇L, y′). Once enough labeled data
have been gathered, a second model f ′ is trained to distinguish between loss gradients of data that
have the property versus those that do not. This model is then used to infer whether subsequent
model updates were made using data that have the property. The model updates are assumed to
be done in batches of data. The attack reaches an attack area under the curve (AUC) score of 98%
and becomes increasingly more successful as the number of epochs increases. Attack accuracy
also increases as the fraction of data with the property in question, also increases. However, as
the number of participants in the distributed model increases, the attack performance decreases
significantly.
5.2.3 Reconstruction attacks. Some data reconstruction attacks in a federated learning setting
make use of generative models and specifically GANs [36, 100]. When the adversary is one of
the participants they can force the victims to release more information about the class they are
interested in reconstructing [36]. This attack works as follows: The potential victim has data for a
class "A" that the adversary wants to reconstruct. The adversary trains an additional GAN model.
After each training round the adversary uses the target model parameters for the GAN discriminator,
whose purpose is to decide whether the input data come from class "A" or are generated by the
generator. The aim of the GAN is to create a generator that is able to generate faithful class "A"
samples. In the next training step of the target model, the adversary generates some data using the
GAN and labels them as class "B". This forces the target model to learn to discriminate between
classes "A" and "B" which in turn improves the GAN training and its ability to generate class "A"
representatives.
If the adversary has access to the central parameter server, they have direct access to model
updates of each remote participant. This makes it possible to mount more successful reconstruction
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attacks [100]. In this case the GAN discriminator is again using the shared model parameters and
learns to distinguish between real and generated data, as well as the identity of the participant.
Once the generator is trained, the reconstructed samples are created using an optimization method
that minimizes the distance between the real model updates and the updates due to the generated
data. Both GAN based methods assume access to some auxiliary data that belong to the victims.
However, the former method generates only class representatives.
In a synchronized SGD setting, an adversary with access to the parameter server has access
to the loss gradients of each participant during training. Using the loss gradients is enough to
produce a high quality reconstruction of the training data samples, especially when the batch size is
small [110]. The attack is utilizing a second "dummy" model. Starting with random dummy inputs
x ′ and and labels y ′, the adversary tries to match the dummy model’s loss gradients ∇θJ ′ to the
participant’s loss gradients ∇θJ . This gradient matching is formulated as an optimization task
that seeks to find the optimal x ′ and y ′ that minimize the gradients’ distance:
x∗,y∗ = argmin
x ′,y′
∥∇θJ ′(D ′;θ ) − ∇θJ(D;θ )∥2 (7)
The minimization problem in Equation 7 is solved using limited memory BFGS (L-BFGS) [53]. The
size of the training batch is an important factor in the speed of convergence in this attack.
Data reconstruction attacks are also possible during the inference phase in a collaborative
inference scenario [31]. This is a setup relevant to situations where remote or edge devices are
connected to a central cloud server but they have limited resources. This scenario is typical with
internet of things (IoT) devices. In collaborative inference the trained model is split into two or
more parts. The edge devices keep the initial layers of the deep learning model and the centralized
server keeps the final layers [29, 47]. The reason for the split is mainly to lower communication
costs by sending intermediate model outputs instead of the input data.
When the local nodes process new data, they perform inference on these initial layers and then
send their outputs to the centralized server. In this attack, the adversary is placed in the centralized
server and their goal is to try to reconstruct the data used for inference. He et al. [31] cover a
range of scenarios: (i) white-box, where the adversary has access to the initial layers and uses
them to reconstruct the images, (ii) black-box where the adversary has no knowledge of the initial
layers but can query them and thus re-create the missing layers and (iii) query-free where the
adversary cannot query the remote participant and tries to create a substitute model that allows
data reconstruction. The latter attack produces the worst results, as expected, since the adversary is
the weakest. The split of the layers between edge device and centralized server is also affecting the
quality of reconstruction. Fewer layers in the edge neural network allow for better reconstruction
in the centralized server.
5.3 Attacks Against Generative Models
Previous sections dealt with attacks on discriminative learning and specifically on supervised
learning. However, attacks on privacy may be relevant for generative models, too. An adversary
may be interested in information about the training dataset used in a generative model or interested
in the model itself. While there is prior research in many different types of generative models, there
are two types that are currently the most popular; Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) and
Variational Autoencoders (VAEs). Most research on attacking generative models has been focused
on these two types of models so far.
Since generativemodels havemore than one component (generator/discriminator, encoder/decoder),
adversarial knowledge needs to take them into account. For these type of models, the taxonomy
proposed by Chen et al. [11] is partially followed. We consider black-box access to the generator as
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the ability to access generated samples and partial black-box access, the ability to provide inputs z
and generate samples. Having access to the generator model and its parameters is considered a
white-box attack. The ability to query the discriminator is also a white-box attack. This scenario,
addressed by Hayes et al. [30] is considered unrealistic, since these component are not likely to be
published. Similarly, the VAE white-box attack requires access to the full VAE model which is also
not a realistic scenario [34]. However, it is important to understand what is possible and what is
not and to establish an upper bound of potential leakage.
So far, the focus of privacy related attacks against GANs and VAEs has been membership
inference [11, 30, 34]. The full white-box attacks with access to the GAN discriminator are based
on the assumption that if the GAN "overfitted", then data points used for its training will receive
higher confidence values as output in the discriminator [30]. In addition to the previous attack,
Hayes et al. proposed a set of attacks in the partial black-box setting. These attacks are applicable
to both GANs and VAEs or any generative model. If the adversary has no auxiliary data, they can
attempt to train an auxiliary GAN whose discriminator distinguishes between data generated by
the target generator and data generated by the auxiliary GAN. Once the auxiliary GAN is trained,
its discriminator can be used for the white-box attack. The authors considered also scenarios where
the adversary may have auxiliary information such as knowledge of training and test data. Using
the auxiliary data they can train another GAN whose discriminator would be able to distinguish
between members of the original training set and non-members.
An attack applicable to both GANs and VAEs in a partial black-box setting was proposed by
Hilprecht et al. [34]. Assuming that an "overfitted" generator will have memorized the training
data, a way to establish membership for a new data sample, is to measure how likely it is to be
close to the training points generated by the generator or encoder using a metric such as Euclidean
distance. The estimation of the probability of a data point being a member of the training set is
performed using Monte Carlo integration while the Euclidean distance was measured based on the
top 40 principal components derived by principal component analysis.
Another distance based attack over the nearest neighbors of a data point, was proposed by Chen
et al. [11] for the full black-box model. In this case a data point x is a member of the training set if
within its k-nearest neighbors there is at least one point that has a distance lower than a threshold
ϵ . The authors proposed more complex attacks as the level of knowledge of the adversary increases,
based on the idea that the reconstruction error between the real data point x and a sample generated
by the generator given some input z should be smaller if the data point is coming from the training
set. In both the partial black-box attack and the white-box attack with access to the generator,
the authors propose to calculate the value of z which provides the smallest distance between a
generated data point and the original one:
z∗ = argmin
z
L(x ,G(z)) (8)
where L is a distance metric. In the image generation domain L calculated based on pixel-to-
pixel similarity, a regularization term and the Learned Perceptual Image Patch Similarity (LPIPS)
metric [108]. Once z∗ is calculated, if the distance between x andG(z∗) is below a certain threshold,
the data point in question is assumed to belong to the training setD. The white-box setting provides
the best results because access to the model allows differentiation and the use of optimization
methods such as L-BFGS.
A property of a successful generative model is to produce high quality samples that cover the
data distribution as much as possible. One of the problems, especially with the training of GANs is
that it is not that easy to measure the generated data quality and distribution support in conjunction
with the training metrics. One of most popular metrics of the quality of a GAN generator is the
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Frechet Inception Distance (FID) which scores both the quality and the diversity of the generated
data. Unfortunately only [11] offers FID measurements for the models under test.
These are early stages of attacks against generative models. While the attacks are promising,
they suffer as the size of the training set increases. The only attack that seems to withstand the
increase of the dataset is the one that assumes access to the discriminator, which is the strongest
possible adversary.
5.4 Design Summary
To summarize the attacks proposed against machine learning privacy, Table 1 presents the 40
papers analyzed in terms of adversarial knowledge, model under attack, attack type and timing of
the attack.
In terms of model types, 92.5% of the papers dealt with attacks against neural networks, with
linear models being the second most popular model to attack at 17.5% (some papers covered attacks
against multiple model types). The concept of neural networks groups together both shallow and
deep models, as well as multiple architectures, such as convolutional neural networks, recurrent
neural networks, GANs, and VAEs.
The most popular attack types are membership inference and reconstruction attacks (35% of
the papers, respectively) with model extraction the next most popular (27.5%). The majority of
proposed attacks are mounted during the inference phase (87.5%). Attacks during training are
mainly against distributed forms of learning. Black-box and white-box attacks were studied in 65%
and 55% of the papers, respectively (some papers covered both settings). In the white-box category
we also include partial white-box attacks.
While there is a diverse set of works presented, it is possible to discern some high-level patterns
in the proposed attacking techniques. Figure 5 shows the number of papers in relation to the
attacking technique and attack type. Most notably, nine papers used shadow training mainly for
membership and property inference attacks. Active learning was quite popular in model extraction
attacks with four papers, while four papers used GANs and another three used gradient matching
techniques. It should be noted here, that the "Learning" technique includes a number of different
approaches, spanning from using model parameters and gradients as inputs to classifiers [61, 65] to
using input-output queries for substitute model creation [13, 39, 72] and learning classifiers from
language models for reconstruction attacks [73]. In "Threshold" based attacks we categorized the
attacks proposed in [106] and [78] and subsequent papers that used them for membership and
property inference.
Some attacks may be applicable against multiple learning tasks and datasets, however, this is not
the case universally. Dataset size and complexity might also be a factor for the success of certain
attacks, especially since most of them are empirical. Table 2 is a summary of the datasets used in all
attack papers along with the data types of their features, the learning task they were used for and
the dataset size. The datasets were used during the training of the target models and in some cases
as auxiliary information during the attacks. The table contains 49 unique datasets used across 40
papers, an indication of the variation of different approaches.
This high variation is both a blessing and a curse. On one hand it is highly desirable to use
multiple types of datasets to test the different hypotheses and the majority of the reviewed research
follows that approach. However, these many options make it harder to compare methods. As it is
evident from Table 2, some of the datasets are quite popular. MNIST, CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100 and UCI
Adult have been used by more than six papers while 24 datasets have been used by only one paper.
The number of model parameters varies based on the model, task and dataset used in the
experiments. As it can be seen in Table 2, most datasets are not extremely large, hence the models
under attack are not extremely large. Given that most papers deal with neural networks this might
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Table 1. Summary of papers on privacy attacks on machine learning systems, including information of their
assumptions about adversarial knowledge (black / white-box), the type of model(s) under attack, the attack
type, and the timing of the attack (during training or during inference)
Reference Year Knowledge Model Type Attack Type Timing
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Fredrikson et al. [20] 2014 • • • •
Fredrikson et al. [19] 2015 • • • • • •
Ateniese et al. [2] 2015 • • • • •
Tramer et al. [91] 2016 • • • • • • • •
Wu et al. [101] 2016 • • • • • •
Hidano et al. [33] 2017 • • • •
Hitaj et al. [36] 2017 • • • •
Papernot et al. [74] 2017 • • • •
Shokri et al. [85] 2017 • • • •
Correia-Silva et al. [13] 2018 • • • •
Ganju et al. [21] 2018 • • • •
Oh et al. [71] 2018 • • • •
Long et al. [55] 2018 • • • •
Rahman et al. [77] 2018 • • • •
Wang & Gong [97] 2018 • • • • •
Yeom et al. [106] 2018 • ◦ • • • • •
Carlini et al. [8] 2019 • • • •
Chen et al. [11] 2019 • • • • •
Hayes et al. [30] 2019 • • • • •
He et al. [31] 2019 • • • • •
Hilprecht et al. [34] 2019 • • • •
Jayaraman & Evans [40] 2019 • • • • • •
Juuti et al. [44] 2019 • • • •
Milli et al. [63] 2019 • • • • •
Nasr et al. [66] 2019 • • • •
Melis et al. [61] 2019 • • • • •
Orekondy et al. [72] 2019 • • • •
Sablayrolles et al. [78] 2019 ◦ • • •
Salem et al. [79] 2019 • • • •
Song L. et al. [88] 2019 • • • •
Truex, et al. [92] 2019 • • • •
Wang et al. [100] 2019 • • • •
Yang et al. [104] 2019 • • • •
Zhu et al. [110] 2019 • • • •
Chandrasekaran et al. [10] 2020 • • • • • • •
Hishamoto et al. [35] 2020 • • • •
Jagielski et al. [39] 2020 • • • •
Krishna et al. [49] 2020 • • • •
Pan et al. [73] 2020 • • • •
Zhang et al. [109] 2020 • • • •
indicate that most attacks focused on smaller datasets and models which might not be representative
of realistic scenarios. However, privacy attacks do not necessarily have to target large models with
extreme amounts of data and neural networks however popular, are not necessarily the most used
models in the "real world".
Another dimension that could be interesting to analyze is the types of learning tasks that have
been the target of attacks so far. Figure 6 presents information about the number of papers in
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Fig. 5. Number of papers that used an attacking technique for each attack type. Darker gray means higher
number of papers.
relation to the learning task and the attack type. By learning task we refer to the task in which the
target model initially trained. As the figure clearly shows, the majority of the attacks are against
models that were trained for classification tasks, both binary and multi-class. This is the case across
all four attack types.
Fig. 6. Number of papers used against each learning task and attack type. Classification includes both binary
and multi-class classification. Darker gray means higher number of papers. This figure shows in which attack
types were still not studied for some learning tasks.
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Table 2. Summary of datasets used in the papers about privacy attacks against machine learning systems.
The size of the datasets is measured in number of samples unless otherwise indicated. A range in the size
column indicates that different papers used different subsets of the dataset.
Name Data Type Learning Task Reference(s) Size (samples)
538 Steak Survey[32] mixed features multi-class classification [10, 19, 33, 91] 332
AT&T Faces [3] images multi-class classification [19, 36, 100] 400
Bank Marketing [16] mixed features multi-class classification [97] 45,210
Bitcoin prices time series regression [91] 1,076
Breast Cancer [16] numerical feat. binary classification [10, 55, 91] 699
Caltech 256 [26] images multi-class classification [72] 30,607
Caltech birds [96] images multi-class classification [72] 6,033
CelebA [54] images binary classification [11, 21, 104, 109] 20-202,599
CIFAR-10 [50] images image generation, multi-class classifi-cation
[30, 31, 34, 39, 63, 77–79, 85,
88, 92, 104, 106] 60,000
CIFAR-100 [50] images multi-class classification [40, 66, 79, 85, 106, 110] 60,000
CLiPS stylometry [94] text binary classification [61] 1,412 reviews
Chest X-ray [99] images multi-class classification [109] 10,000
Diabetes [16] time series binary class., regression [10, 91, 97] 768
Diabetic ret. [46] images image generation [30, 72] 88,702
Enron emails text char-level language model [8] -
Eyedata [80] numerical feat. regression [106] 120
FaceScrub [69] images binary classification [61, 104] 18,809-48,579
Fashion-MNIST [102] images multi-class classification [34, 39, 88] 60,000
Foursquare [103] mixed features binary classification [61, 79, 85] 528,878
Geog. Orig. Music [16] numerical feat. regression [97] 1,059
German Credit [16] mixed features binary classification [91] 1,000
GSS marital survey [27] mixed features multi-class classification [10, 19, 91] 16127
GTSRB [89] images multi-class classification [44, 74] 51839
HW Perf. Counters numerical feat. binary classification [21] 36,000
Imagenet [15] images multi-class classification [39, 71, 78] 14,000,000
Instagram [4] location data vector generation [11] -
Iris [18] numerical feat. multi-class classification [10, 91] 150
IWPC [12] mixed features regression [20, 106] 3497
IWSLT Eng-Vietnamese text neural machine translation [8] -
LFW [37] images image generation [30, 61, 110] 13233
Madelon [16] mixed features multi-class classification [97] 4,400
MIMIC-III [43] binary features record generation [11] 41,307
Movielens 1M [28] numerical feat. regression [33] 1,000,000
MNIST [51] images multi-class classification
[10, 21, 31, 34, 36, 39, 44, 55,
63, 71, 74, 77, 79, 85, 91, 92,
100, 104, 106, 109, 110]
70,000
Mushrooms [16] categorical feat. binary classification [10, 91] 8,124
Netflix [67] binary features binary classification [106] 2,416
Netflows network data binary classification [2] -
PTB [58] text char-level language model [8] 5 MB
PiPA [108] images binary classification [61] 18,000
Purchase-100 [45] binary features multi-class classification [40, 66, 85, 92] 197,324
SVHN [68] images multi-class classification [39, 110] 60,000
TED talks [38] text machine translation [8] 100,000 pairs
Texas-100 [9] mixed features multi-class classification [66, 85] 67,330
UJIndoor [16] mixed features regression [97] 19,937
UCI / Adult [16] various binary classification [10, 21, 55, 79, 85, 91, 92] 48,842
Voxforge [95] audio speech recognition [2] 11,137 rec.
Wikitext-103 [62] text word-level language model [8, 49] 500 MB
Yale-Face [22] images multi-class classification [88] 2,414
Yelp reviews [105] text binary classification [61] 16-40,000
6 WHY DOMACHINE LEARNING MODELS LEAK?
The connection between overfitting and black-box membership inference was initially investigated
by Shokri etal. [85]. The authors showed experimentally that overfitting can lead to privacy leakage
but also noted that it is not the only condition. This finding was later corroborated by Yeom et
al. [106] where they showed that overfitting is a sufficient condition for performing membership
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inference attacks but not a necessary one. Additionally, Long et al. [55] showed that even in well
generalized models, it is possible to perform membership inference for a subset of the training data
which they named vulnerable records.
Other factors, such as the model architecture, the model type, and the dataset structure, affect
attack accuracy. Models with smaller generalization error on the same dataset were shown to leak
more in some MLaaS cases [85]. This means that model type and complexity are an important
factor in membership inference. Similarly, in the white-box setting, Nasr et al. [66] showed that two
models with the same generalization error showed different degrees of leakage. More specifically
the most complex model in terms of numbers of parameters exhibited higher attack accuracy,
showing that model complexity is also an important factor.
Truex et al. [92] ran different types of experiments to establish the significance of model and
data complexity. They found that certain model types such as Naive Bayes are less susceptible to
membership inference attacks than decision trees or neural networks. They also found that the
complexity of the data increases the potential of membership leaks. The higher number of classes
led to highest attack accuracy [92].
Securing machine learning models against adversarial attacks can also have an adverse effect
on the model’s privacy as shown by Song et al. [88]. Current state of the art proposals for robust
model training, such as projective gradient descent (PGD) adversarial training [56], increases the
model’s susceptibility to membership inference attacks. This is not unexpected since robust training
methods (both empirical and provable defenses) tend to increase the generalization error. As
previously discussed, the generalization error is related to the success of the attacks. Furthermore,
the authors of [88] argue that robust training may lead to increased model sensitivity to the training
data, which can also affect membership inference.
The generalization error is easily measurable in supervised learning under the assumption
that the test data can capture the nuances of the real data distribution. In generative models and
specifically in GANs this is not the case, hence the notion of overfitting is not directly applicable.
All three papers that deal with membership inference attacks against GANs, mention overfitting as
an important factor behind successful attacks [11, 30, 34]. In this case, overfitting means that the
generator has memorized and replays part of the training data. This is further corroborated in the
ablation study in [11], where their attacks are shown to be less successful as the training data size
increases.
While black-box membership inference attacks are connected to overfitting this is not necessarily
the case with other types of attacks. Model extraction is possible even when the models under
attack have 98% or higher accuracy rate in the test set [71]. Property inference is also possible
against well-generalized models [21, 61].
When it comes to reconstruction attacks, Yeom et al. [106] showed that a higher generalization
error can lead to higher probability in inferring data attributes, but also that the influence of the
target feature to the model is an important factor. However, they assume that the adversary has
knowledge of the prior distribution of the target features and labels. Using weaker assumptions
about the adversary’s knowledge, Zhang et al. [109] showed theoretically and experimentally
that a model that has high predictive power is more susceptible to reconstruction attacks. Finally,
similarly to vulnerable records in membership inference, memorization and retrieval of data which
are out-of-distribution was shown to be the case even for models that do not overfit [8].
7 DEFENDING MACHINE LEARNING PRIVACY
Leaking personal information such as medical records or credit card numbers is usually an unde-
sirable situation. The purpose of studying attacks against machine learning models is to be able
to explore the limitations and assumptions of machine learning and to anticipate the adversaries’
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actions. Most of the analyzed papers propose and test mitigations to counter their attacks. One of
the most popular proposed countermeasure is differential privacy (DP). This section presents a non
exhaustive overview of differential privacy as it is used in privacy preserving machine learning
(PPML), as well as other defensive measures proposed in the reviewed literature.
7.1 Differential Privacy
Differential privacy started as a privacy definition for data analysis and it is based on the idea of
"learning nothing about an individual while learning useful information about a population" [17].
Its definition is based on the notion that if two databases differ only by one record and are used by
the same algorithm (or mechanism), the output of that algorithm should be similar. More formally,
Definition 7.1 ((ϵ,δ )-Differential Privacy). A randomized mechanism M with domain R and
output S is (ϵ,δ )-differentially private if for any adjacent inputs D,D ′ ∈ R and for any subsets of
outputs S it holds that:
Pr [M(D) ∈ S] ≤ eϵPr [M(D ′) ∈ S] + δ (9)
where ϵ is the privacy budget and δ is the failure probability.
The original definition of DP did not include δ which was introduced as a relaxation that allows
some outputs not to be bounded by eϵ .
The usual application of DP is to add Laplacian or Gaussian noise to the output of a query
or function over the database. The amount of noise is relevant to the sensitivity which gives an
upper bound on how much we must perturb the output of the mechanism in order to preserve
privacy [17]:
Definition 7.2. l1 (or l2)-Sensitivity of a function f is defined as
∆f = max
D,D′, ∥D−D′ ∥=1
∥ f (D) − f (D ′)∥ (10)
where ∥.∥ is the l1 or the l2-norm and the max is calculated over all possible inputs D,D ′.
From a machine learning perspective, D and D ′ are two datasets that differ by one training
sample and the randomized mechanismM is the machine learning training algorithm. In deep
learning the noise is added at the gradient calculation step. Because it is necessary to bound the
gradient norm, gradient clipping is also applied [1].
Differential privacy offers a trade-off between privacy protection and utility or model accuracy.
Evaluations of differentially private machine learning models against membership inference attacks
concluded that the models could offer privacy protection only when they considerably sacrifice
their utility [40, 77]. Jayaraman et al. [40] evaluated several relaxations of DP in both logistic
regression and neural network models against membership inference attacks. They showed that
these relaxations have an impact to the utility-privacy trade off. While they reduce the required
added noise they also increase the privacy leakage.
Distributed learning scenarios require additional considerations when it comes to differential
privacy. In a centralized model the focus is on sample level DP, i.e., in protecting the privacy at the
individual data point level. In a federated learning setting where we have multiple participants, we
not only care about the individual training data points they use but we care about ensuring privacy
at the participant level. A proposal which applies DP at the participant level was introduced by
McMahan et al. [60] however it requires a large number of participants. When it was tested with a
number as low as 30 the method was deemed unsuccessful [61].
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7.2 Other Defensive Approaches
While differential privacy is one of the most popular countermeasures proposed in attack oriented
papers, there are several other defences that have been explored.
(1) Regularization. Most often in the form of dropout, regularization, is proposed by multiple
papers with varying levels of success [8, 30, 61, 79, 85, 88]. Given that black-box membership
inference attacks are connected to overfitting, it is a sensible approach against this type of
attack.
(2) Prediction vector tampering. As many models assume access to the prediction vector
during inference, one of the countermeasures proposed was the restriction of the output to
the top-k classes or predictions of a model [85]. However, this restriction, even to the strictest
form (outputting only the class label) did not seem to fully mitigate membership inference
attacks, since information leaks can still happen due to model misclassifications. The level of
prediction vector truncation affects also reconstruction attacks, but it does not stop them
completely [104]. Another option is to lower the precision of the prediction vector which
leads to less information leakage [85]. Adding noise calculated using adversarial learning,
also thwarts membership inference attacks [42].
(3) Model compression. Setting all the loss gradients which are below a certain threshold
to zero, was proposed as a defence against reconstruction attacks in deep learning. This
technique proved quite effective with as little as 20% of the gradients set to zero and with
negligible effects in model performance [110].
(4) Ensemblemethods, such as model stacking were tested in [79] and produced positive results
against membership inference.
(5) Noisy data addition. Randomly flipping labels on 5% of the training data had moderate
success on preventing property inference attacks [21].
(6) Weight Quantization or using half-precision floating points for neural network weights
did not seem to deter the attacks in [8] and [110], respectively.
(7) Selective sharing of gradients. In a distributed learning system that uses synchronized SGD,
Shokri and Shmatikov proposed that the participants can partially share their gradients with
the parameter server [83]. While this did not impact the model performance, it was later
shown to be an inadequate measure [76].
(8) Protecting against DNN Model Stealing Attacks (PRADA). Detecting model stealing
attacks based on the model queries that are used by the adversary was proposed by Juuti
et al. [44]. The detection is based on the assumption that model queries that try to explore
decision boundaries will have a different distribution than the normal ones. While the
detection was successful, the authors noted that it is possible to be evaded if the adversary
adapts their strategy.
(9) Membership inference. The idea of using membership inference in order to defend against
model extraction was studied by Krishna et al. [49]. It is based on the premise that using
membership inference the model owner can distinguish between legitimate user queries and
nonsensical ones whose only purpose is to extract the model. The authors note that this
type of defence has limitations such as potentially flagging legitimate but out-of-distribution
queries made by legitimate users, but more importantly that they can be evaded by adversaries
that make adaptive queries.
8 DISCUSSION
Attacks against machine learning privacy have been increasingly brought to light. However, we
are still at an exploratory stage. Many of the attacks are applicable only under specific sets of
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assumptions or do not scale to larger training data sets, number of classes, number of participants, etc.
The attacks will keep improving and in order to successfully defend against them, the community
needs to answer fundamental questions about why they are possible in the first place. While
progress has been made in the theoretical aspects of some of the attacks, there is still a long way to
go when it comes to achieve better theoretical understanding of privacy leaks in machine learning.
As much as we need answers about why leaks happen at a theoretical level, we also need to know
how well privacy attacks work against real deployed systems. Adversarial attacks against realistic
systems brought to light the issue of additional constraints that need to be in place for the attacks
to work. When creating glasses that can fool a face recognition system, Sharif et al. [82], had to
pose constraints that had to do with physical realizations, e.g., that the color of the glasses should
be printable. In privacy related attacks, the most realistic attacks come from the model extraction
area, where attacks against MLaaS systems have been demonstrated in multiple papers. For the
majority of other attacks, it is certainly an open question of how well they would perform against
deployed models and what kind of additional requirements need to be in place for them to succeed.
At the same time, the main research focus up to now has been supervised learning. Even within
supervised learning, there are areas and learning tasks that have been largely unexplored, such
as recurrent models. In unsupervised learning, the focus is mainly in generative models and only
just recently papers started exploring areas such as representation learning. Some attacks against
image classifiers, do not transfer that well against natural language processing tasks [35] while
others do, but may require different sets of assumptions and design considerations [73].
Beyond expanding the focus to different learning tasks there is the question of datasets. The
impact of data complexity in the attack success has been demonstrated by several papers. Yet,
currently, we lack a common approach as to which datasets are best suited to demonstrate privacy
attacks, or constitute the minimum requirement for a successful attack. Several questions are worth
considering: do we need standardized datasets and if yes how do we go about and create them?
Are all data worth protecting and if some are more interesting than others, shouldn’t we be testing
attacks beyond popular image datasets?
Finally, as we strive to understand the privacy implications of machine learning, we also realize
that several research areas are connected and affect each other. We know, for instance, that adver-
sarial training adversely affects membership inference [84] and that model censoring can still leak
private attributes [87]. Property inference attacks can deduce properties of the training dataset
that were not specifically encoded or were not necessarily correlated to the learning task. This can
be understood as a form of bias detection which means that relevant literature in the area of model
fairness should be reviewed as potentially complementary. Looking at adjacent areas of machine
learning research might help us improve our understanding of privacy attacks, too.
9 CONCLUSION
As machine learning becomes ubiquitous, the scientific community becomes increasingly interested
in its impact and side-effects in terms of security, privacy, fairness, and explainability. This survey
conducted a comprehensive study of the state-of-the-art privacy-related attacks to create a new
threat model and taxonomy of the different types of attacks and their characteristics. An in-depth
examination of the different types of attacks allowed us to perform a further analysis which revealed
common design patterns and differences between them. Our analysis revealed a somewhat narrow
focus of the research conducted so far. At the same time, a thorough theoretical understanding of the
reasons behind privacy leaks is still under-developed and this affects both the proposed defensive
measures and our understanding of the limitations of privacy attacks. While the community is
still in exploratory mode in regards to privacy leaks of machine learning systems, we hope that
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this survey will provide the necessary background to both the interested readers as well as the
researchers that wish to continue working in this topic.
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